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ABSTRACT 
This paper  examines  the determinants  of the number  and quality  of  outside 
applicants  for federal job openings  using a variety  of time-series, 
cross-sectional  and panel data sets.  The main finding  is that  the 
application  rate for government  jobs increases  as the ratio  of federal  to 
private  sector  earnings  increases,  but does not appear to be related to 
the relative  level of fringe benefits.  Furthermore,  an increase  in  the 
federal-private  sector  earnings  differential  is associated  with  an 
increase  in  the average  quality of  applicants  for federal  jobs.  The 
paper  discusses  the implications  of  these  findings  for wage determination 
and recruitment  in the federal government. 
Alan B.  Kruger 
Department  of  Economics  and 
Woodrow  Wilson  School 
Princeton  University 
Princeton,  NJ  08544 Since  1962, wage  determination  in  the federal government  has 
ostensibly  been guided  by the principle  of equal wages  with  comparable 
private  sector jobs.  To accomplish  this  goal,  the Bureau  of Labor 
Statistics  (BLS) annually  conducts  a survey  of  wages  of white  collar  jobs 
in private  sector  establishments,  and based upon this survey  a 
Presidential  Commission  recommends  across  the board  wage  adjustments  to 
bring  about  equality between  federal  and private  sector  wages.  Recently, 
the comparability  process  has been severely  criticized,  and alternative 
measures  for guiding federal pay have  been  proposed.1 Host notably,  the 
U.S. Office  of  Personnel  Hanagement  (OPM) has proposed  analyzing  data on 
turnover  and application  rates  to adjust  federal wages.2  If high  quit 
rates  or low application  rates make it difficult  to  attract,  retain  and 
motivate  the federal workforce,  wages  would be adjusted  accordingly. 
Linking  wage rates to the governments ability  to attract and retain 
competent  employees  has the appeal of reflecting  the underlying  implicit 
job queue,  and thus appears consistent  with  cost  minimizing  behavior. 
Furthermore,  unlike  the wage survey  approach,  these measures  have  the 
virtue  of reflecting  workers'  evaluations  of nonwage  compensation,  such 
as fringe benefits,  job security  and working  conditions.  As a matter  of 
practice,  turnover  and application  information  are already used  by the 
Special Rates and Analysis  Division  to evaluate  requests  for off-scale 
1  In  years  when  the survey  finds  that  wages of federal workers  trail 
wages  of comparable  private  sector  workers,  econometric  analyses by Smith 
(1976,  1977), Quinn  (1979),Venti  (1986), Tracy  and Gyourko  (1986) and 
Krueger (1987) find that after  controlling  for observed  and unobserved 
worker characteristics  federal wages  exceed  private  wages by as much as 
15% to  20%. 
2 
See, for instance,  OPMs controversial  report,  "Reforming  Federal  Pay: 
An Examination  of Hore  Realistic  Pay Alternatives,"  December  1984. -2- 
wage rates  for a small proportion  of  federal joba.  A precise 
understanding  of the determinants  of turnover  and job applications  is 
necessary  if this approach  is to be  effectively  used to  set wages for 
federal workers  on  a wide scale. 
Although  there  is a relatively  large  literature  on turnover, 
surprisingly  little  is known  about  the determinants  of applicants  for job 
openings  in the public  or private  sectors.3  There are many  questions 
that  one would  want to answer  before  using application  rates  as an input 
in wage determination.  For instance,  does the application  rate  depend  on 
the differential  in  wages and fringe benefits  between  federal and private 
sector  workers?  Do macroeconomic  factors  such as unemployment  affect  the 
rate of job applicants?  How does the average quality  of job applicants 
vary  with wagea  and macroeconomic  conditions?  This  paper  analyzes  a new 
collection  of  time-series  and cross-sectional  data  to examine  the 
determinants  of applicants  for federal jobs.  Section one of the paper 
summarizes  the institutional  process  of applying  for federal jobs.  In 
section two a simple  model  of  the supply  of  job applicants  is presented. 
The empirical  results  that are presented  in  section  three support  a 
conclusion  that the application  rate  for federal jobs  is very responsive 
to relative  federal-private  sector wages and macroeconomic  conditions, 
but does  not appear  to be related to the relative  level of nonwage 
compensation. 
See Long (1982), Utgoff  (1983), Mussel (1986), Ippolito  (1987) and 
Black, Moffitt  and Warner  (1987)  for comparative  studies of turnover  in 
the federal  and private  sectors.  See Barron  and Bishop  (1986), Dc Vany 
and Saving  (1981), and Holzer,  Katz  and Krueger  (1988) for contributions 
to the modest  literature  on  job applications. -3- 
1.  The Federal Job Application  Process 
In 1985 the federal government  received about 4.5 million requests 
for information  regarding  job openings, processed nearly 1.2 million 
completed  job applications from individuals  who were not employed  by the 
government,  and hired 134,224  new employees.4  Below I consider the 
system that generates and processes applications for federal  jobs. 
For the majority of job openings,  agencies hire workers from outside 
the federal government through the Office of Personnel  Management's Open 
Competitive  Appointment  System.  This system is administered  by OPM and 
its Area Offices.  When it is decided that a position should  be filled by 
an outside employee, OPM advertises the job opening in its Job 
Information  Centers, specifies  the minimum qualifications needed  to 
perform the job, and announces  the job's starting salary.  In its 
instructions to job applicants,  OPM advises potential applicants  not to 
apply for a job unless they "fully meet the qualification requirements, 
will work in the location(s)  for which applications are being accepted 
and will accept the salary  of the position."  This process is intended to 
screen out applicants who are not qualified for the position. 
Applications are accepted only for the specific positions that have 
job openings.  However, for many occupations, including  most clerical, 
engineering, nursing and accounting  jobs, there is a continual  need for 
new hires, so applications are accepted on an on-going basis. 
Individuals  may submit an application  for more than one job opening. 
These data and the subsequent  data used in the paper are based on 
workers hired through the  competitive  appointment system  which excludes 
postal workers. -4- 
An  application  consists  of  a  completed  job  application  blank  and  in 
many  cases  also includes references,  academic records and civil service 
exam results.  Job applicants are evaluated on the basis of this informs- 
tion.  An inventory  of eligible or qualified  applicants is kept in 
federal  "registers'  for each occupation.  OP1 then refers  a list of the 
eligible applicants ranked in order of their  qualifications to the 
specific agency  that has  a job vacancy.  The agency  must select  a 
candidate from the three most highly rated job applicants on the 
register. 
Applications typically remain  active on the register for a period of 
12 months.  After the 12 month period expires, however, the applicant may 
request to have his or her name remain  active on the register for an 
additional  year.  Thus, the registers  mainly contain applicants who 
currently desire government  employment. 
After 1978,  in cases where a specific  agency or local area is the 
sole or predominant employer of an occupation,  OPM may delegate complete 
responsibility  for recruitment and hiring to the agency or area.  By 
1985,  about one-third of federal job applications  that were processed and 
selections that were made were delegated  to individual agencies and local 
areas.  Examples of occupations that  OPM has delegated include air 
traffic controllers (delegated  to the Federal Aviation Authority) and 
ship-fitters (delegated  to local federal ports). 
The data used in this paper are drawn from the lists of applications 
maintained  by OPM and its predecessor  organization, the U.S. Civil 
Service Commission.  Applications and selections that are delegated to 
agencies and local areas are added to the total to make the series 
consistent over time. 2.  Model 
A simple  model of workers' decisions to apply for federal jobs is 
presented  below.  The basic framework is that optimizing agents compare 
their expected lifetime  utility from applying for a job in the federal 
sector (including  the cost of applying)  to their expected lifetime 
utility of not applying in deciding  whether to apply for a federal job.5 
An employee will apply for a government  job if his expected utility is 
higher if he applies for the job than if he does not apply. 
Assume that each individual  has a utility function of the form: 
(1)  U  = U(Wi,Bi)  BU/BW > 0,  BU/BB >  0  ;  i = (g,p) 
where W' represents  the employee's  discounted  value of earnings in sector 
i, and B1 represents  a vector of nonwage benefits (fringe  benefits, 
working conditions,  etc.) attached to sector i.  The superscript  i refers 
to either government jobs,  g, or private sector  jobs, p.  I initially 
simplify  the problem by assuming that all workers are identical in terms 
of their abilities and preferences, and have probability q of being 
selected  by the government  should they apply for a job.  It is further 
assumed that individuals'  preferences satisfy the von Neumann-Morgenstern 
axioms. 
If an individual  applies for a government job he is hired with 
probability q and has lifetime utility U; with probability (l-q)  the 
This model is formally similar to John Abowd and Henry Farber's (1982) 
model of implicit queues for union jobs and Rebecca Blank's (1985)  model 
of sectoral choice.  The present approach differs from these previous 
studies in that I explicitly model actual applications instead of 
implicit job queues, and in estimating the model I use direct 
observations on the number of applications and selections. —6- 
applicant is not selected for the job and takes his best private sector 
alternative  which gives him utility  U.6  Finally, I assume that the cost 
in terms  of utility of applying for a government  job is  and  the 
utility  cost  of  applying  for  a  private  sector  job  is C.  These costs 
reflect the time and psychic costs  of filling out an application, taking 
an exam, and interviewing for a job. 
An individual  will apply for a government  job if the net expected 
utility of applying for the job is greater than the net utility of his or 
her private sector  alternative.  That is, he or she will apply if 
qU(W,B) + (1-q)U(W,B)  -  -  (l-.q)C > U(W,B)  - C,  or equivalently 
if q[U(W,B)  - U(W,B)  + cI > C]  In equilibrium, open competition 
for federal jobs will lead individuals  to apply for government jobs until 
the marginal applicant is indifferent  between applying and not applying 
for the job, so 
(2)  qjU(W,B)_U(WP,BP)  +  = 
The  intuition  behind  equation  (2) is that in expected value there 
are no rents  to be made on the margin  by applying for a government job. 
6 
As setup, the model assumes that the prospective applicant  will take a 
private sector job with certainty if he does not apply for, or is not 
selected for, a government job.  This will follow  if the worker currently 
has a private sector  job.  If the worker does not have a certain private 
sector alternative, he or she will weigh the utility of the private 
sector job by the probability of getting a job there.  As a  result,  the 
empirical analysis controls for aspects of the labor  market which 
influence the probability of getting a private sector  job, such as the 
unemployment  rate. 
Note that this equation does not imply that the utility function is 
risk neutral; instead, it implies that the uncertain outcome of applying 
for a government or private sector  job may be analyzed in terms of 
expected utility. —7-. 
The number  of individuals  applying for job openings adjusts to eliminate 
ex ante rents associated  with government  jobs.  As wage and nonwage 
compensation  offered by the federal government rise relative to the 
private sector,  individuals  will Continue to apply for a given number of 
federal  job openings until the marginal worker is indifferent  between 
applying to either sector.  And as the cost of applying for a federal job 
increases or the cost of applying for a private sector job decreases, 
fewer individuals  will apply for a given number of federal job openings 
so that equation (2) will again hold. 
Heterogeneous  Labor with Nonrandom Selection 
If individuals  differ in their productive capacities,  and if the 
government  is able to make job offers to applicants  on the basis of 
workers' perceived abilities, the analysis  becomes more complicated.  The 
purpose here is only to present a heuristic discussion of these effects. 
It is probably reasonable  to assume that individuals have a noisy 
estimate of their ability relative to the population, and that the 
government has an imperfect  but positively correlated  measure of each 
applicant's  ability.  A final assumption is that there is a positive 
correlation  between an individual's alternative  wage in the private 
sector and his or her ability. 
An increase in the relative attractiveness of government employment 
(i.e.  an increase in  and 5g holding W  and B  constant) in this 
situation has two opposing effects on the application  rate.  First, a job 
candidate's  expectation of being rated the most highly qualified 
applicant and therefore  of being selected for the job is diminished. 
This occurs  because individuals  with higher alternative  wages and 
therefore  greater expected ability will apply for the job (Weiss,  1980; -8- 
Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1982).  The average quality of the job queue 
increases.  In the extreme case,  if employees  know with certainty who the 
most qualified applicant for the job will be, only that individual  will 
apply for the job. 
The second  effect occurs because the government job has become 
relatively  more attractive and is therefore  worth applying for even 
though  the chance of ultimately  being selected for the job is reduced. 
This is the result that is developed formally in the model above in the 
case of homogeneous labor. 
If, as seems likely,  there is considerable uncertainty  as to the 
quality of competing  job applicants and the validity of the government's 
selection  criteria, and little cost of applying for a government job,  the 
second  effect will dominate.  However, the direction and magnitude of the 
effect of a change in the relative  attractiveness of government 
employment  on the application rate are empirical issues. 
3.  The Determinants of Job Applicants 
Figure 1 depicts the relationship  between the application rate for 
all federal jobs (measured  by the ratio of outside applications to new 
hires) and the ratio of federal to private sector earnings.  The relative 
earnings  variable in this instance is drawn from the National Income  and 
Product Accounts because this is the only available source  of annual 
earnings data that covers the entire  period over which application  rate 
data are available.8  The figure shows that applications per new hire and 
8 
Although the theoretically  appropriate  earnings variable is the 
present discounted  value of lifetime earnings in each sector, because of 
data limitations current annual earnings for full-time equivalent 










































































































































































































































































relative earnings fluctuate  substantially  over time.  A fairly close 
relationship  between the two variables is apparent, especially  between 
1960 and 1980.  In years when the federal wage increases relative to the 
private sector  wage applications  per new hire generally increase, and in 
years when the federal wage decreases relative to the private sector  wage 
applications  per new hire tend to decrease. 
The tightness or looseness  of the labor market also has an important 
effect on the value and availability  of individuals'  private sector 
alternatives.  And in this connection it should be noted that employment 
in the federal government  displays relatively little cyclical  variation 
(Freeman, 1987).  Figure 2 illustrates  the relationship  between the 
application rate and the unemployment  rate.  The unemployment rate is an 
indicator of the availability of private sector alternatives as well as a 
measure of job search intensity.  The application rate closely tracks the 
unemployment rate.  The pattern strongly suggests that when the labor 
market becomes loose from an employee's  perspective, the number of 
applicants for federal job openings increases. 
Table 1 reports results from  estimating multiple regressions to 
predict the log of the annual application  rate for federal  jobs.  Since 
the application rate displays serial  correlation, I correct for first 
order autocorrelation.9  Appendix Table Al reports results of regressions 
on first-differences.  Several factors are held constant in the 
regressions  to isolate the effect of the federal wage differential on the 
application rate.  General labor  market conditions are measured by the 
The coefficient  estimates are qualitatively similar  when a second 












































































































































































































































































































 unemployment rate and by the Conference  Board's national index of help 
10  wanted ads.  Two dummy variables are included to control for 
differences  in federal recruitment  practices over time:  specifically,  in 
years after 1974 Post Offices were no longer  used for recruiting,  and in 
years after 1965 OPM consolidated several of its regional offices. 
Finally, a time trend is included to control for secular trends in 
applications.  The variables and data sources used in the regressions  are 
described in greater detail in the Data Appendix.11 
The regression results reinforce the conclusions  drawn from Figures 
1 and 2.  The economic variables account for a large share of annual 
variations in the application  rate.  Furthermore, the log of the 
government  wage relative to the private sector wage denoted by in(W/Wl) 
has an economically sizable and statistically significant  effect on the 
number of applications per worker  hired.12  A  one percent increase in the 
wage of federal workers over the wage of private sector  workers is 
associated with about a two percent increase in the number of job 
applications per federal worker hired.  Moreover, this relationship 
becomes stronger when additional  variables are held constant. 
10  .  . 
See Medoff  (1983)  for a discussion of the relationship  between 
unemployment, help wanted ads, and labor  market pressure. 
In results not reported  here I also control for the size and growth 
rate of the labor force, the size of the federal government (measured  by 
the log of employment), one period lagged  relative wages, and years in 
which the Carter-Reagan hiring freeze  was in effect.  Controlling for 
these variables does not qualitatively  change the regression  estimates. 
12 
Following Ehrenberg (1973)  and Ashenfelter and Ehrenberg's (1975) 
work on public sector labor demand, the government wage differential is 
taken as exogenous of the length of the job queue.  This assumption seems 
reasonable  because of the political factors that influence  determination 
of wages in the federal government,  and because the federal wage is 
unlikely to have an important effect  on the aggregate private sector  wage 
(see Borjas, 1980 and 1984;  Reder, 1975). Table 1 
The Determinants of Applicants for Federal Jobs,  1951_1985a 
(Standard  Errors in Parentheses) 
Independent 
Variables  (1)  (2) 
Equationb 
(3)  (4)  (5) 








































Dummy  Variable 
(Post  1965=1) 





(Post  1974=1) 




Time Trend  ---  --—  -  .008 
(.006) 










Adjusted R2  .846  .812  .855  .869  .872 
Durbin-Watson  1.445  1.626  1.496  1.349  1.288 
Notes: 
a.  Dependent variable is ln(Applicants/New  Hires).  Mean [SDJ of 
dependent variable is 2.06  [.231.  Sample  size is 35. 
b.  The Cochrane-Orcutt  procedure is used  to correct for first order 
serial correlation. 
c.  is the average wage  of full-time equivalent  federal civilian 
employees, and  W is the average wage  of full-time equivalent 
private  sector employees.  Both variables are derived from the 
National Income  and Product Accounts.  See Data Appendix. 
* Significant at the 10% level;  "  significant of the 5% level; 
significant  at the 1% level. —11— 
The specification of the relative  earnings variable in Table  1 
constrains  the federal salary  and private sector  salary to have equal but 
opposite signed effects on the application  rate.  To check the 
appropriateness of this specification,  the regressions  are re-estimated 
allowing 1n(W) and 1n(W) to enter as separate regressors.  The results 
of this exercise provide support for the specification  in Table 1.  For 
example, the results of re-estimating  column (1) which are reported  below 
show that the government  wage and private sector  wage have virtually 
equal but opposite effects on the application  rate (AIR) for federal jobs, 
holding the unemployment rate (UR) and help wanted index (11W)  constant. 
ln(AR) = 1.34 + 1.96  lfl(W)  - 1.92  1n(W)  + 5.36 UR - .21  kIWI 
(.18)  (.46)  (.50)  (2.52)  (.12) 
Adj.—R2 = .85  p = .37  DW  = 1.47  (S.E.'s  in parentheses) 
Although the estimates reported above and in Table 1 rely on wage 
data from the National Income  and Product Accounts (NIPA),  the effect of 
relative wages on applications is positive and statistically  significant 
when other sources of wage data are used.  For instance,  when the average 
wage of federal employees  directly estimated from  OPH's Central Personnel 
Data File is used to re—estimate  column (3) of Table 1, the coefficient 
(standard  error) on the relative earnings variable is 1.66 (35)13 
Alternatively, when the same regression is estimated  using the earnings 
13 
Tabulations from  OPHs Central Personnel Data File are reported 
annually in Pay Structure of the Federal Civil Service (Washington,  D.C. 
OPM).  An employment-weighted  average of blue collar and white collar 
earnings of federal workers is the numerator of the relative wage 
variable; the denominator  is the average private sector  wage from the 
National Income  and Product Accounts. -12- 
differential derived from the PATC comparability  survey, which is 
available only in the years between 1968 and 1985,  the coefficient 
(standard  error)  on relative  earnings is 1.44 (.46).14 
Turning next to measures of the general condition  of the labor 
market, the unemployment rate and help wanted index have their expected 
signs and usually border on statistical  significance.  A one percentage 
point increase in the unemployment rate,  for instance,  is associated with 
a 6.49 percent increase in the application  rate according to the estimate 
in column (3).  However, the size and significance of the effect of the 
unemployment rate diminishes  when the dummy variables for recruitment 
policies and the time trend are added to the regression.15 
An increase in the index of help wanted ads  is associated  with a 
decline in the number of applicants  per federal  job opening.  In 
comparison  to the wage ratio  and the unemployment  rate,  however, the 
regressions  imply that a one standard deviation change in the help wanted 
index  has a relatively small  effect on the application rate.  Finally, I 
note that after controlling  for the government  wage differential, labor 
market conditions,  and changes in recruitment  practices, the application 
rate displays a slight  upward trend over time. 
14 
Since  Freeman finds that the various estimates of the federal-private 
sector  wage differential from the PATC survey, OPN's Personnel Data File, 
and NIPA tend to move together over time although at a point in time they 
often seem inconsistent,  it is not very surprising  that all three 
variables yield relatively  similar results here. 
15 
Results are qualitatively  unchanged when the unemployment rate and 
help wanted index are entered in log form. —13- 
Fringe Benefits 
There is a widespread perception that fringe benefits in the federal 
government exceed  those in the private sector (e.g.  Hartman 1983).  To 
examine the impact of the relative level of fringe  benefits on the 
federal job application  rate,  the regression reported  below controls for 
the log of the ratio of average federal nonwage compensation to average 
private sector  nonwage compensation for full-time  equivalent employees 
(B8/B),  using NIPA wage and nonwage  data. 
in (AR)  1.21 ÷ 2.12 1(W/P )  -  .02  ln(B/8F)  + 6.71  UR -  .16  HWI 
(.23)  (.46)  (.08)  (1.96)  (.11) 
Adj.-R2 = .85  p  .36  DW = 1.49  (S.E.'s in parentheses) 
Surprisingly, the regression indicates  that an increase in the level 
of fringe benefits in the federal government  relative to the private 
sector has a  small, statistically insignificant,  effect on the 
application rate.'6  Moreover, the small  standard error of this estimate 
implies that the economically negligible effect of relative fringe 
benefits on applications is precisely estimated.  The relative earnings 
variable, however, continues to have a sizeable,  positive impact  on 
federal job applicants  after controlling  for nonwage compensation. 
Why might fringe  benefits be unrelated to job applicants?  One 
possible explanation is that prospective  job applicants are not 
16 
It should  be noted that this result  does not appear to be entirely 
driven by multicollinearity between relative earnings and relative fringe 
benefits because the  relative fringe  benefits variable has a small, 
statistically insignificant (though  positive) effect  on the application 
rate when the relative earnings variable is dropped from the regression. immediately  cognizant of the availability or generosity of fringe 
benefits.  Nonwage compensation,  such as pension benefits and health 
insurance,  might not be a very salient or relevant feature of work for 
job applicants,  while in contrast,  earnings are easily  measured and 
immediately  relevant.  On the other hand, another possible explanation is 
that nonwage labor costs are a very noisy measure of the value of fringe 
benefits to workers.  Random measurement error would have the effect of 
biasing the relative fringe  benefit coefficient toward zero. 
Sex Differences 
The federal government's equal employment opportunity  policy and 
affirmative action  program give preferential treatment in hiring to 
women.'7  This might be expected to lead to a different  relationship 
between applications and wages for men and women.  In addition, 
differences in geographic  mobility between men and women might also 
affect application rates.  Unfortunately, diaggregated  application  data 
are not available to perform a separate analysis by sex.  However, it is 
possible to estimate the effect of sex differences in the relative 
federal-private  sector  earnings differential on the overall application 
rate. 
Table 2 presents log application regressions  controlling  for the log 
of the ratio of federal to private sector earnings for the median, 
17  The same argument can be applied to the hiring of minorities and 
verterans,  but these issues are not examined empirically  because 
sufficient time-series  data on relative earnings by sector  are not 
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Adjusted R2  .783  .775  .792 
Durbin-Watson  1.952  1.675  1.840 
Notes: 
a.  Dependent variable is ln(Applications/New  Hires).  Sample size is 27. 
b.  The Cochrane-Orcutt  procedure is used to correct for first order 
serial correlation. 
c.  is the median earnings of fall-time,  year-round workers, and W  is 
the median earnings of full-time,  year-round private sector  workers. 
These data are from the CPS. 
* Significant  at the 10% level;  significant  at the 5% level; 
significant at the 1% level. 
The Effect 
for Men and 
Table 2 
of the Federal to Private Sector  Earnings Ratio 
a  Women on the Overall Application  Rate, 1959-1985 
(Standard  Errors in Parentheses) -15- 
full-time,  year-round  male and female  worker.18  Changes in the 
federal-private  earnings differential for the median  male and median 
female  worker have about an equal,  positive impact  on the overall job 
application rate.  The elasticity  of the overall application  rate with 
respect to relative earnings is slightly greater for male workers than 
female  workers, but the difference  is not statistically significant  at 
conventional  levels.  Furthermore, these conclusions  are unchanged when 
the sample  period is restricted  to years after the Civil  Rights Act took 
effect. 
Quality of Applicants 
The results presented so far do not control for the quality of job 
applicants.  Unfortunately, only scant evidence is available on the 
quality of applicants for federal  jobs.  One admittedly crude  measure of 
the quality of applicants  for federal jobs is the number of applicants 
who were judged minimally qualified to perform their  prospective  job.19 
OPM collected such data nationally in 22 of the last 36 years.  On 
average, 59% of applicants  were judged  minimally qualified for  their 
prospective  jobs during these  years. 
Table 3 presents regression results  predicting the log of the number 
of minimally qualified applicants  per new hire for the years in which 
18  . 
The  relative  earnings  variables  are  drawn  from  unpublished 
tabulations  of  the  March  Current  Population  Survey  and were provided by 
the Census Bureau.  For years between 1975 and 1985 all federal employees 
are identified in the CPS;  for the period 1958 to 1975,  only federal 
public administration  employees are identified. 
19  A  potential problem with this measure is that standards and tests for 
determining  minimally qualified applicants  may vary somewhat over time. 
If the standards used to judge applicants are lowered when it is 
difficult to recruit workers, the relationship between qualified 
applicants and relative  wages will be biased toward  zero. —16- 
data are available.  To aave degreea of freedom, only the relative wage 
rate and labor  market factors are held constant.  For comparison, the 
second  column of the table reports regression  estimates  of the log of the 
overall application  rate on the same set of controls and sample.  The 
third column examines the effect  of the independent  variables on the log 
of the ratio of minimally qualified applicants  to all applicants. 
The table shows that a one percent change  in the federal wage 
differential haa a greater positive impact  on the number of qualified 
applicants  per new hire than on the total  application rate  during this 
time period.  As a result, the fraction  of job applicants  who are at 
least minimally qualified to perform the job they  applied for increases 
as the average federal-private  wage differential increases. 
Finally, it appears that the application  rate of qualified  workers 
is less responsive than the total application  rate to changes in the 
unemployment rate and help wanted index.  The effect of these two 
variables on the fraction of the applicant  pool that is considered 
qualified, however, is statistically insignificant. 
Within-Occupation  Analysis 
The aggregate time-series  analysis above reflects the entire 
spectrum of federal and private sector  jobs.  This approach ia 
appropriate  if the mix of federal and private sector  jobs remained 
relatively  constant over the  time period  studied. 
To examine the effect of relative  wages on the number of applicants 
for federal jobs within the aame occupation,  the following equation is 
estimated with panel data: Table 3 
The Determinants  of Qualified Applicants for Federal JObSa 
(Standard  Errors in Parentheses) 
(1) 
Dependent Variable 
(3)  (2) 
La  (Qualified  La  (All  La (Qualified 
Independent  Mean  Applications!  Applications!  Applications! 
Variables  [SD]  New Hires)  New Hires)  All Applications) 
Intercept  1.00  .132  1.270d  -1.  138" 
[.00]  (.260)  (.200)  (.233) 
fl(/P)b  .27  3974*  1 .764'  2.21O* 
[.08]  (.531)  (.408)  (.477) 
Unemployment  .05  3.964  8.132d  -4.167 
Rate  [.01]  (3.364)  (2.586)  (3.023) 
Help Wanted  1.08  .068  -.130  .198 
Index  [.20]  (.189)  (.145)  (.170) 
Adjusted R2  .878  .822  .671 
Durbin—Watson  1,118  1.295  .553 
Notes: 
a.  Equations are estimated by OLS.  Sample contains annual  observations 
from 1950—1962  and 1970—1978.  Mean [SDI  of dependent  variable in 
column (1) is 1.48 [.39],  in column (2) is 2.04 [.25],  and in column (3) 
is -.55 [.21].  Sample size is 22. 
b.  is the average wage of full-time  equivalent federal civilian 
employees,  and Wr'  is the average wage of full-time equivalent 
private sector  employees.  Both variables are derived from the 
National Income and Product Accounts. 
Significant at the  10% level;  significant  at the 5% level; 
significant  at the 1% level, —17— 
(4)  ln(AR) 
=  +  ln(Wt/W) 
+ 2  t 
÷ 3 
j  + 
Lit 
(i=1,...,N)  (t=1,...,T) 
where AR.t  denotes  the application  rate in the federal government, 
denotes the average government  wage relative to the average 




denotes the index of help wanted ads, and 0. is a 
fixed  occupation effect.  The subscript  i refers  to occupation and  t to 
year.  Data are available for five  occupational groups  —- steno-typists, 
secretaries,  engineers, accountants  and auditors, and computer 
specialists -- for  the years 1978 to 1985. 
The equation is estimated  by generalized  least squares to allow for 
correlation in the error term, L,  across occupations  in a given  yearS 
The results of this estimation  are reported in Table 4.  Adding 
occupation dummies to the regression  reduces the effect of the relative 
wage variable on the application rate,  but the relative  wage variable 
continues to have a statistically  significant  and sizable impact on the 
application  rate.  A one percent increase in the government  wage 
differential is associated  with a 2.37 percent increase in the 
application  rate according  to the within-occupation regression.  This 
estimate is similar in magnitude to the elasticity  of applications with 
respect to relative  wages obtained  from the aggregate time-series 
analysis. 
The white collar  unemployment rate appears to have a very large 
effect  on the application rate in both the inter and intra-occupation 
analyses.  The point estimates indicate that a one percentage  point 
increase in the unemployment rate has a much greater effect  on the Table 4 
The Determinants of Applicants for Federal Jobs: 
Within Occupation  Analysisa 
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23.  88* 











Steno-Typist  .20 
[.40] 
---  -.314 
(.167) 
Secretary  .20 
[.40] 
---  - . 320 
(.082) 








---  .525 
(.150) 
Notes: 
a.  Dependent variable is ln(Applications/New  Hires).  Mean [SD] of 
dependent variable is 2.17 [.52].  Sample size is 40.  Equations are 
estimated by constrained  seemingly unrelated regression. 
b.  Relative wages are derived from the PATC survey. 
c.  The omitted occupation  dummy variable is computer specialist. 
* Significant  at the 10% level;  significant  at the 5% level; 
significant at the  1% level. -18- 
application rate in the white collar  occupation analysis than in the 
aggregate  time—series  analysis.  The index  of help wanted ads,  however, 
has an insignificant  effect in the occupational  analysis. 
Lastly, I note that there is considerable variation in the 
application rate across  occupational lines even after controlling for 
occupation specific relative  wage differentials.  Engineers appear to 
have the lowest application  rate while accountants  and auditors appear to 
have the greatest application rate  among the five occupational groups. 
Thia pattern might reflect the relative supply  of workers with these 
types of skills  or unmeasured aspects of the relative attractiveness  of 
government  employment that  varies across these occupations. 
Inter-City Analysis 
With relatively few exceptions,  the government  pays the same wage to 
20  workers who are in the same grade of an occupation  nationwide.  Private 
sector  wages, on the other hand, vary considerably  across regions and 
cities  of the U.S.  The rigid government  nominal wage schedule therefore 
leads to differences  in the ratio of government  wages to private sector 
wages across cities,  and if workers are mobile, should influence the 
number of applicants  for federal jobs across cities.  To what extent can 
inter-city  variability in the federal to private sector  wage ratio 
explain the  inter-city  pattern of application  rates? 
City—wide  application rates  for federal nursing jobs are examined 
here because the qualifications for these jobs are well defined, and 
because requisite  data are available for eleven cities.  In terms of 
20 
Special wage rates introduce some regional flexibility in the federal 
wage schedule.  In addition, inflated job classifications  introduce 
another source  of flexibility.  Borjas (1980)  finds evidence of wage 
dispersion  within occupations  across federal  agencies. -19- 
number of employees,  nursing is the fifth largest white collar occupation 
in the federal government.  It it noteworthy that more than 
three-quarters  of federal nurses  work in Veterans Administration 
hospitals,  and that 91% of federal nursing jobs were filled  by women in 
1985.  The proper alternative  wage for federal nurses is probably the 
wage of nurses employed by non-federal  hospitals in the nearby geographic 
area. 
Table 5 presents the application  rate for federal nursing jobs and 
the ratio  of average earnings of nurses employed  by federal VA hospitals 
to average earnings of nurses employed  by non-federal  hospitals in each 
city.  Looking across cities, there appears to be a weak positive 
relationship between the application  rate and  relative  earnings (r.22). 
In Washington,  D.C. and St. Louis, for instance,  the federal wage is 
relatively  high compared to non-federal  sector  wages for nurses, and the 
government  receives relatively  many applicants  per new hire.  And in 
spite of the above scale federal wage rate that is in effect for federal 
nurses in San Francisco, the extremely  high wage rate offered by the non- 
federal sector  appears to lead to a very low application  rate for federal 
nursing jobs in that city.  Nonetheless, some significant  anomalies are 
evident.  For example, the number of applications  per nurse hired in New 
York is the highest among the eleven cities, while the ratio of federal 
to non-federal  earnings is relatively  low in New York. Table 5 
Applicants for Federal Nursing Jobs and Relative Earnings 
in Eleven Cities, Fiscal Year 1985 
City 
Applications 
per New Hire 
Ratio of Federal 
to Non-Federal 
Earnings 
Atlanta  8.15  1.30 
Boston  3.77  1.14 
Chicago  9.78  1.22 
Dallas  3.12  1.30 
Denver  1.00  1.15 
New York  27.40  1.09 
Philadelphia  7.37  1.19 
Seattle  2.81  1.14 
.  San Francisco  2.73  b 
.90 
St.  Louis  10.17  1.24 
Washington,  D.C.  19.34  121b 
Notes: 
a.  The number of applications  per selection  were kindly provided  by 
Margaret Higgins of OPM.  Non-federal  hourly nursing wages are 
reported in the August 1985 Industry  Wage Survery: Hospitals 
(Washington,  D.C.: Bulletin 2273,  February 1987),  and are converted  to 
annual  earnings by multiplying  by 2,000.  The average salary of federal 
nurses is reported in Pay Structure  of the Federal Civil Service 
(Washington,  D.C.: OPM, 1985,  p. 31). 
b.  Special above-scale  wage rates  are in effect for federal nurses in 
San Francisco and Washington, D.C.  The reported earnings ratios  are not 
adjusted for these special  rates. -20- 
4.  Conclusion 
This paper has examined the determinants  of queues for federal 
government  jobs as measured by the job application  rate.  The principal 
findings  are: 1) the number of job applications filed per worker hired 
increases sharply as the average wage of government  workers increases 
relative to the average wage of private sector  workers; 2) the number of 
qualified applicants  per worker hired, as well as the fraction of job 
applicants  who are qualified to perform their prospective  job, increases 
as the relative average wage of government  workers increases;  3) the 
number of applications  per new hire does not appear to be related to the 
relative level  of fringe  benefits; and 4) the number of applications  per 
new hire increases as the unemployment rate increases,  and decreases as 
the help wanted index increases.  Noreover, these conclusions  seem to 
hold in both aggregate time-series  data and in longitudinal data on 
occupational groups  over time. 
These findings have several implications  for federal wage setting 
and recruitment  policy.  The analysis shows that an increase in the wage 
of federal workers will lead to an increase in the number and average 
quality of applicants for federal  jobs.  Since job application  rates 
appear to reflect economic incentives,  the case for using application 
data as a mechanism for adjusting wages is strengthened.  If the number 
of job applications for a given job opening falls below or rises  above a 
certain level,  wages can be adjusted accordingly to minimize costs.  In 
addition, the results suggest that increasing fringe  benefits is not an 
effective  way to recruit workers. 
An important  unresolved issue is the determination of the proper 
standard for judging the optimal number of applicants for job openings  ir —21- 
the federal government.  A backlog of applicanta allowa  vacanciea to be 
filled  rapidly and facilitates  efficient  job matchea, but reaourcea  are 
uaed inefficiently if wages are set above the optimal level.  A natucal 
standard of comparison for the government's  application rate is the 
application rate for jobs in the private sector.  A first attempt to 
compare job queues in the government and private sector is presented in 
Krueger (1987).  However, a comparison  between the application  rate in 
the private and public sectors  is hindered by the salience  of the 
government  and by differences  in recruitment  practices used by public and 
private sector employers.  It is noteworthy  that Bishop, Barron and 
Hollenbeck (1984)  and others find that employer size and search 
activities  have an important  effect on the number of applications 
received  by private sector establishments.  The application  rate for 
federal sector jobs and private sector  jobs may not be directly 
comparable. 
An alternative  approach would  be to study the effect  of differencea 
in application rates on the productivity and efficiency  of government 
agencies.  The optimal application  rate can be based on organizational 
performance  and actual experience rather  than on a rigid comparison  with 
private sector employers.  Finally, a valuable complement to the analyaia 
here would be an examination  of the determinants of the rate at which 
workers turn down job offers.  Like the application rate,  the turn down 
rate reflects  workers' alternative  opportunities in the labor market. 
The job turn down rate can serve as a additional indicator  of the 
relative generosity of compensation. -22— 
Data Appendix 
The sources and definitions  of the variables used in the  time-series 
analysis in Tables 1 and Al are below. 
Mean 
Variable  [S.D.) 
Application Rate =  The total number of applicants  for  8.02 
federal nonpostal civilian jobs divided by the total  number  [1.78) 
of workers hired from those applicants.  The data are on a 
federal fiscal  year basis. From 1950 to 1978 the data are 
reported in various issues  of the Annual  Report of the U.S. 
Civil Service Commission. (The applicant rate for 1968 and 
1969 are approximate.)  Application  and new hire data for 
years after 1978 were kindly  provided by Iargaret Higgins 
and Van Yee of OPN and include delegations. 
=  The annual  average wage of full-time  equivalent  1.32 
civilian non-postal federal employees divided  by the average  [.091 
annual wage of full-time equivalent  private sector  workers. 
Data are on a calendar year basis.  Source:  National Income 
and Product Accounts. 
= The annual  nonwage compensation of full-time equivalent  1.15 
civilian non-postal federal workers divided by the average  [.32) 
annual nonwage compensation of full-time equivalent  private 
sector  workers. Nonwage compensation includes  mandatory 
employer contributions to social insurance,  voluntary fringe 
benefits, and other labor income.  Data are on a calendar year 
basis.  Source:  National Income and Product Accounts. 
Unemployment Rate = Average  of twelve  monthly unemployment 
rates on a federal fiscal  year basis.  Source:  Employment  .06 
and Earnings (Washington,  D.C.: Bureau of Labor Statistics,  [.021 
various years). 
Help Wanted Index =  Conference  Board Index of Help Wanted  1.12 
Ads in 50 newspapers.  The index  was adjusted for changes in  [.231 
competition in the newspaper industry and in the occupational 
composition  of the labor force  over time using the procedure 
developed by Katherine  Abraham in  'What Does the Help Wanted 
Index Measure" (Bookings Paper on Economic Activity, 1986). 
Dummy Variable (Post 1965)  0 if before 1966,  and 1  in 1966  .31 
and after.  In 1966,  the 688 agency boards of Civil Service  [.471 
Examiners were consolidated into 65 Inter-agency Boards. -23- 
Dummy  Variable (Post 1974)  =  0  in years before 1975,  and 1 in  .56 
1975  and after.  By 1975  the Civil Service Commission had  [.50} 
assumed complete responsibility  from the U.S.  Postal Service 
for testing job applicants and providing information  to 
prospective  applicants. Table Al 
The Determinants of Applicants for Federal Jobs, 1951-1985 
OLS Regressions on First Differences 
(Standard  Errors in Parentheses) 
Independent 
Variables  (1)  (2) 
Equationa 
(3)  (4)  (5) 






















—--  — . 346 
(.084) 
- .214** 





---  ---  ---  -.202k 
(.103) 
-  .204* 
(.106) 
Dummy Variable 
(Post  1974=1) 




Time Trend  ---  ---  ---  ---  .002 
(.018) 
SEE  .109  .109  .104  .101  .103 
Durbin—Watson  2.106  1.965  2.052  1.927  1.927 
Notes: 
a.  Models were estimated  with OLS after taking first  differences of the 
dependent and independent  variables.  Sample size is 35. 
b.  is the average wage of full-time  equivalent federal civilian 
employees, and W  is the average wage of full—time  equivalent 
private sector  employees.  Both variables are derived from the 
National Income  and Product Accounts.  See Data Appendix for definitions 
and sources of other variables. 
* Significant  at the 10% level;  significant  at the 5% level; 
significant  at the 1% level. -24- 
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